Panopticlick illustrates that even without cookies etc., modern browsers usually send enough specific-enough information to Web servers so that you can be tracked. The various useful standard HTTP headers effectively work like a fingerprint of your browser/OS/hardware combination.
When I look at the Panopticlick results of my favorite browser (I get 22.26 bits of "identifying information", while more senior users have reported scores up to full 24 :-), one thing that stands out is a long list of "System Fonts". Arguably it is useful for me when Web sites know what fonts I have installed on my system, so that they can present Web pages with fonts that I actually have rather than having to send me the fonts as well. So the intention is good, but the implementation discloses too much of my typographic tastes. What can we do to fix this?
Well, that should be quite obvious: Instead of my browser sending the full list of fonts, it could send a Bloom filter that matches the fonts that I have. When a Web server wants to render a document for me, it can check for some candidate fonts whether I have them. Bloom filters are approximative and will sometimes generate false positives, but one Comic Sans Web page in 1'000 or so should be a small price to pay to get my
You may respond that a priori the Bloom filter discloses as much of my privacy as the full list of fonts. But! I can simply send a new Bloom filter ("salted" differently) to each site I visit. Voilà how I'll defeat all traceability of Web visits, undermine the business model of the Internet economy, and destroy the entire Western civilization. Muahaha!
(Bloom Filter-Enabled Limited Disclosure)
(Apologies to smb and Bill Cheswick, who seem to have fully baked and published a better version of this idea in 2007, and to the probably numerous others)